CROWLEY V. CHRISTENSEN.

Supreme Court of the United States.

CROWLEY, CHIEF OF POLICE v. CHRISTENSEN.
Every citizen may pursue any lawful trade or business under lawful restrictions imposed upon all persons of the same age, sex and condition,
which are deemed essential by the local authority to the safety, health,
peace, good order and morals of the community.
A citizen has no inherent right to sell liquor at retail, and the police
powers of the State can be exercised in its restraint or prohibition without raising any question of Federal law from a supposed lawfulness of the
business.
T
The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (I886), i8 L . S. 356, distinguished on
the ground that the laundry business was harmless in itself, and useful to
the community, while the retail liquor business could not be carried on
without a license, which might be refused without violating any inherent
right of a citizen.

Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of California, discharging
Henry Christensen from the custody of the Chief of Police
of the City and County of San Francisco.
I

J. D. Page and Davis Louderback, for appellant
Josephk D. Redding and Al4red Clarke, for appelleeJ., lNovember io, 189o. This is an appeal from
an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of California, discharging, on habeas corpus, die petitioner for the writ, the appellee here, from the
custody of the Chief of Police of the City and County of
San Francisco, by whom he was held, under a warrant of
arrest issued by the Police Court of that municipality, upon
a charge of having engaged in and carried on in that City,
the business of selling spirituous, malt and fermented liquors
and wines, in less quantities than one quart, without the
license required by the ordinance of the City and County.
The ordinance referred to provides that every person who
sells such liquors or wines in quantities less than one quart
shall be designated as "a retail liquor dealer" and as "a
grocer and retail liquor dealer"; and that no license as such
FIELD,
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liquor dealer, after January i,i886, "shall be issued by the
collector of licenses, unless the person desiring the same shall
have obtained the written consent of a majority of the Board
of Police Commissioners of the City and Count-% of San
Francisco, to carry on or conduct said business, but, in case
of refusal of such consent, upon application, said Board of
Police Commissioners shall grant the same upon the written
recommendation of not less than twelve citizens of San
Francisco owning real estate in the block or square in which
said business of retail liquor dealer or grocery and retail
liquor dealer is to be carried on"; and that such license
shall be issued for a period of only three months. The ordinance further declares that any person violating this provision shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
The Constitution of California provides, in the eleventh
section of Article XI, that "any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local,
police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict
with g-cneral laws."
The petitioner had, previously to June io, 1889, carried
on the business of retail liquor dealer in San Francisco for
some years, under licenses from the Board of Police Commissioners, but his last license was to expire on the seventeenth
of that month. Previously to its expiration, lie was informed by the Police Commissioners that they had withdrawn their consent to the further issue of a license to him.
He afterwards tendered to the collector of license fees,
through which officer it was the practice of the Board to
i..ue the licenses, the sun required for a new license, but the
;.nder was not accepted, and his application for a new license
was refused. He then applied to the Police Commissioners
for a hearing before them on the question of revoking their
consent to the issue of a further license to him. Such hearing was accorded to him, and the time fixed for it was the
twent--fourth of June. But before any hearing was had, he
waarrested, upon a warrant of the Police Court, upon the
charge of carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer
without a license. He then obtained from the Supreme
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Court of the State, a writ of habeas corbus to oe discharged
from the arrest, but that Court, on the second of August,
i89o, held the ordinance valid, and remanded him to the
custody of the Chief of Police (24 Pac. Repr. 747). He
then applied for the allowance of an appeal from this order
to the Supreme Court of the United States, but it was refused by the Chief Justice of the State Court, and the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
assigned to the circuit, who could have allowed the appeal,
was absent from the State.
On the seventh of August following, a new complaint
was made against the petitioner, charging him with unlawfully engaging in and carrying on in San Francisco, the
business of a retail liquor dealer without a license under the
ordinance of the City and County. Upon this complaint, a
warrant was issued, under which he was arrested. He thereupon applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for a
writ of habeas corpus, which was issued. In return to the
writ, the Chief of Police, the appellant here, stated that he
held the petitioner under the warrant mentioned by the petitioner, and several other warrants issued by the Police Court
of the City and County, upon different charges, made at
different times, of his conducting and carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer in San Francisco without a
license, as required by the ordinance of the City and County.
He also stated, among other things, that a further license to
the petitioner was refused by the Police Commissioners, because they had reason to believe that the business was carried
on by him under his existing license in such a manner as to
be offensive, and violative of the criminal laws of the State,
and of the rights of others. In support of this charge, it
was averred that in that business the petitioner was assisted
by one whom he represented and claimed to be his wife, and
that she had on one occasion stolen $i6o from a person who
visited his saloon, and been convicted of the offense in the
Superior Court of the City and County, and sentenced to be
imprisoned for one year, and on another occasion had stolen
a watch and a scarf-pin from a person at the saloon, and was
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held to answer for the charge. It was also averred that
there were more than sixteen citizens of San Francisco owning real estate in the block on which the petitioner carried
on his business.
It does not appear that, on the hearing of the application,
any proof was offered of the facts alleged either in the petition or in the return. The case was heard upon exceptions
or demurrer to the return. To that part respecting the
alleged larceny by the wife and her conviction, the demurrer
was on the ground that the return also showed that an appeal
had been taken from the conviction, which was then pending, and that she might be acquitted of the offense charged.
Several objections were urged by the petitioner to the ordinance. Some of them were of a technical character, and
could not be considered. Of the others, only one was
noticed, which was that by it "the State of California, by its
officers, denies to him the equal protection of the laws, and
makes and enforces against him a law which abridges his
privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States,"
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. The Court held that the ordinance
made the business of the petitioner depend upon the arbitrary will of others, and in that respect denied to him the
equal protection of the laws, and accordingly ordered his
discharge ('if;-a, and also reported in 43 Fed. Repr. 243).
From the order, the case is brought.to this Court byappeal,
under sections 763 and 764 of the Revised Statutes, this
latter section as amended by the Act of March 3, 1885, ch.
353 (23 Stat. at Large 437).

It is undoubtedly true that it is the right of every citizen
of the United States to pursue any lawful trade or business,
under such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of
the same age, sex and condition. But the possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the
country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order
and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the
VoL. XXX-13
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greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is.only freedom from restraint
under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the
same right by others. It is then liberty regulated by law.
The right to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of property is declared in the constitutions of several States to be one of the
inalienable rights of man; but this declaration is not held to
preclude the legislature of any State from passing laws respecting the acquisition, enjoyment and disposition of property. What contracts respecting its acquisition and disposition shall be valid, and what void and voidable, when they
shall be in writing, and when they may be made orally, and
by what instruments it may be conveyed or mortgaged, are
subjects of constant legislation. And, as to the enjoyment
of property, the rule is general that it must be accompanied
with such limitations as will not impair the equal enjoyment
by others of their property. Sk utere tuo ut alienum non
la'das is a maxim of universal application.
For the pursuit of any lawful trade or business the law
imposes similar conditions. Regulations respecting them
are almost infinite, varying with the nature of the business.
Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some
by the odors they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the l6cality in which
they shall be conducted. Some by the dangerous character
of the articles used, manufactured or sold, require also special
qualifications in the parties permitted to use, manufacture or
'sell them. All this is but common knowledge, and would
hardly be mentioned were it not for the position often taken,
and vehemently pressed, that there is something wrong in
15rinciple and objectionable in similar restrictions when applied to the business of selling by retail, in small quantities,
spirituous and intoxicating liquors.
It is urged that as the liquors are used as a beverage, and
the injury following them, if taken in excess, is voluntarily
inflicted, and is confined to the party offending, their sale
should be without restrictions, the contention being that
what a man shall drink, equally with what he shall eat, is
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not properly matter for legislation. There is in this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist-that,
when the liquors are taken in excess, the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true, first
falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines;
in his morals which it weakens; and in the self-abasement
which it creates. But, as it leads to neglect of business and
waste of property, and general demoralization, it affects those
who are immediatly connected with and dependent upon
him.
By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized
and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and
misery to society equal to the drain-shop, where intoxicating
liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold
indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of
every State show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail
liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such
liquors in this way has therefore been, at all times, by the
courts of every State, considered as the proper subject of
legislative regulation. Not only may a license be exacted
from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors
can be thus disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as
to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the
hours of the day, and the days of the week, on which the
saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be
absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency
and public morality, and not of Federal law. The police
power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business, to mitigate its evils, or to suppress it entirely. There
is no inherent rightin acitizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors
by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of
a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended
with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be
entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as
will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent
of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may
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deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licenses for that purpose.
It is a matter of legislative will only.' As in many other
cases, the officers may not always exercise the power conferred upon them with wisdom or justice to the parties
affected. But that is a matter which does not affect the
authority of the State, or one which can be brought under
the cognizance of the courts of the United States.
The Constitution of California vests in the municipality
of the City and County of San Francisco the right to make
"all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are
not in conflict with general laws." The Supreme Court of
the State has decided that the ordinance in question, under
which the petitioner was arrested, and is held in custody,
was thus authorized, and is valid. That decision is binding
upon us, unless some inhibition of the Constitution or of a
law of the United States is violated by it. We do not perceive that there is any such violation. The learned Circuit
Judge saw in the provisions of the ordinance empowering
the Police Commissioners to grant or refuse their assent to
the application of the petitioner for a license, or, failing to
obtain their assent upon application, requiring it to be given
upon the recommendation of twelve citizens owning real
"estate in the block.or square in which his business as a retail
dealer in liquors was to be carried on, the delegation of arbitrary discretion to the Police Commnissioners, and to real
estate owners of the block, which might be and was exercised to deprive the petitioner of the equal protection of the
laws. And he considers that his view in this respect is supported by the decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (I886), 118
U. S. 356.
In that case it appeared that an ordinance of the City and
County of San Francisco, passed in July, i88o, declared that
it should be unlawful after its passage "for any person or persons to establish, maintain or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the City and County of San Francisco without
having first obtained the consent of the Board of Supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed
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either of brick or stone." The ordinance did not limit the
power of the Supervisors to grant such consent, where the
business was carried on in wooden buildings. It left that
matter to the arbitrary discretion of the Board. Under the
ordinance, the consent of the Supervisors was refused to the
petitioner to carry on the laundry business in wooden buildings, where it had been conducted by him for over twenty
years. He had at the time a certificate from the Board of
Fire Wardens that his premises had been inspected by them,
and upon such inspection they had found all proper arrangements for carrying on the business, and that all proper precautions had been taken to comply with the provisions of
the ordinance defining the fire limits of the City and County;
and also a certificate from the Health Officer that the premises had been inspected by him, and were properly and sufficiently drained, and that all proper arrangements for carrying on the business of a laundry without injury to the sanitary conditions of the neighborhood had been complied with.
The limits of the City and County embraced a territory
some ten miles wide, by fifteen or more in length, much of
it being occupied at the time, as stated by the Circuit Judge,
as farming and pasture lands, and much of it being unoccupied sand-banks, in many places without buildings within
a quarter or half.a mile of each other. It appeared also that,
in the practical administration of the ordinance, consent was
given by the Board of Supervisors to some parties to carry
on the laundry business in buildings other than those of
brick or stone, but that all applications coming from the
Chinese, of whom the petitioner was one, to carry on the
business in such buildings were refused. This Court said of
the ordinance:
It allow's, without restriction, the use for such purposes of buildings of
brick or stone; but as to wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those
in previous use, it divides the owners or occupants into two classes, not
having respect to their personal character and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those
who are permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent
of the Supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is
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withheld, at their mere will and pleasure. And both classes are alike
only in this: that they are tenants at will, under the Supervisors, of their
means of living. The ordinance, therefore, also differs from the not
unusual case where discretion is lodged by law in public officers or bodies
to .grant or ,Qithhold licenses to keep taverns, or places for the sale of
spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit person for the exercise of the privilege, because in
such cases the fact of fitness is submitted to the judgment of the officer,
and calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature.

It will thus be seen that that case was essentially different
from the one now under consideration, the ordinance there held
invalid vesting uncontrolled discretion in the Board of Supervisors with reference to a business harmless in itself and
-useful to the community, and the discretion appearing to
have been exercised for the express purpose of depriving the
petitioner of a privilege that was extended to others. In the
present case the business is not one that any person is permitted to carry on without a license, but one that may be entirely prohibited or subjected to such restrictions as the governing authority of the City may prescribe.
It would seem that some stress is placed upon the allegation of the petitioner that there were not twelve persons
owners of real property in the block where the business was
to be carried on. This allegation is denied in the return,
which alleges that there were more than sixteen such property holders. As the case was heard upon exceptions or demurrer to the return, its averments must be taken as true.
At common law, no evidence was necessary to support the
return. It was deemed to imporf verity until impeached:
Hurd, Hab. Corp. bk. 2, ch. 3, §§ 8-1o; Church, Hab. Corp.
And this rule is not changed by any statute of the
§ 122.
United States. It must therefore be considered as a fact in
the case that there were more than sixteen owners of real estate in the block. But if the fact were otherwise, and there
was not the number named in the petition, the result would
not be affected. If there were no property holders in the
block, the discretionary authority would be exercised finally
by the Police Commissioners, and their refusal to grant the license is not a matter for review by this Court, as it violates
no principle of Federal law. . We, however, find in the re-
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turn a statement which would fully justify the action of the
Commissioners. It is averred that, in the conduct of the
liquor business, the petitioner was assisted by his wife, and
that she was twice arrested for larcenies committed from persons visiting his saloon, and in one case convicted of the offense, afid sentenced to be imprisoned, and in the other held
to answer. These larcenies alone were a sufficient indication of the character of the place in which the business was
conducted for the exercise of the discretion of the Police
Commissioners in refusing a further license to the petitioner.
The order discharging the prisoner must be reversed, and
the cause remanded, with directions to take further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. And it is so ordered.
[While the subject of liquor sel
ing would be the first suggested for
an annotation to the foregoing case,
the power by which the final determination of the rights of a liquor
seller is reached, affords an equally
apt subject, and the following interesting statement of the effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment can best
be read in immediate connection
with the pregnant sentences of
Justice FIELD'S opinion.-ED.
Among the engrossing topics of
the reconstruction period, that
which most largely engaged public
attention was the great increase of
representation that the South was
to secure by the manumission of the
-laves. The North did not look
with favor upon the additional
two-fifths representation which accrued in the Southern States as a
result of the Civil War. In justice
to the loyal States, and injustice to
the recently emancipated negro, a
new and different basis of representation was demanded.
The obvious necessity of amending the Constitution in this respect
was first suggested in Congress by

Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, December
5, 1865. Early in the following
year the subject was again brought
forward by Mr. Spaulding, of Ohio,
-Mr.Blaine and others, and various
forms of the Amendment proposed.
Long and earnest debates ensued
in both houses, the issues being
confined almost exclusively to the
matter of readjustment.
On the 3oth of April, 1866, ajoint
resolution was reported from the
Committee on Reconstruction proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the
form of which, as then submitted,
was the first incomplete draft of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The
question of the change of the basis
of representation was the leading
feature of the Amendment, but discussion had developed the necessity for incorporating other matters, closely allied to the main
issue, and essential to the work of
reconstruction.
The threatened abridgement of
the rights of the negro had led to a
declaration, perhaps unnecessary,
of the rights of a citizen of the
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United States; and the meaning of
the term "citizen" had evoked
the final amendment to the first
section, the definition of national citizenship. The Fourteenth
Ainendment in its completed form
was finally adopted by Congress on
the 13th day of June, 1866, and in
due time was ratified by the various
States.
The second, third and fourth sections of the Amendment fully met
thetemporary emergency for which
they were designed, and are now
practically historical records of a
momentous period. The first section, though called into being by
the same spirit of necessity, has, in
its general adaptation to all persons
and all times, the elements of perpetual life. Its scope was but imperfectly realized upon its adoption. It seemed only a part of the
reconstruction legislation. When
the Supreme Court of the United
States, six years later, approached
the consideration of this first section, the magnitude of the questions involved in its construction
became evident. "We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us," says Justice Mm.LER. "No questions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting
to the people of the country, and
so important in their bearing upon
the relation of the United States,
and of the several States to each
other and to the citizens of the
States and of the United States,
have been before this Court during
the official life of any of its present
members": SlaughterHouse Cases
(1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36, 67.
In theSlaughterHouse Cases,the
'Court attempted to limit the application of this section, by rules of

close constmction; but-notwithstanding the prudent disinclination
of the Supreme Bench to interpret
its terms tooliberally, the generous
scope of its provisions has of later
years offered to citizens of every
class, at least the hope of relief
from the oppressive legislation of
the State.
The decisions construing its provisions grow more numerous every
year, as their beneficent nature is
unfolded by the Courts in the effort
to restrain the enforcement of selfish and discriminating laws.
Every part of the section has, to a
greater or less extent, been considered by the Supreme and Federal
Courts, so that it is possible to discuss the adjudications upon each
provision in the order stated in the
Amendment. The whole section
reads as follows (according to the
text of Poore's Charters and Constitutions, page 123):
"SEcTIoN I. All persons born
or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United
States, and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shallany State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
The first authoritative interpretation of the Amendment was hadin
the SlaughterHouse Cases,decided
in 1873. Each clause was elaborately discussed by a divided Court,
as evidenced by three remarkably
able dissenting opinions. Theconstruction of the various provisions
of the section as then adopted,
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though tacitly modified in some
respects, remains to-day as the authoritative exposition of the meaning and applications of its terms:
First:Citizenship.
This clause declares what shall
constitute citizenship of the United
States as well as citizenship of the
State.
A distinction, however, ig recognized between National and State
citizenship in the SlaughterHouse
Cases. A citizen of a State is always a citizen of the United States,
but the converse is not necessarily
true. Residence in the State is a
pre-requisite of State citizenship,
but is not essential to National citizenship. Citizenship of the United
States is primary : that of a State,
secondpry. The Amendment makes
the citizenship of the United States
and of a State dependent on the
place of birth or fact of adoption.
[See also a leading article on Citizens, their Rights and Immunities,
27 AmERICAN LAW REGISTER 539..
Second: Privileges and Immunities.
Precisely what are the "privileges and immunities" that appertain to a citizen of the United
States does not appear to be definitely settled. The question was
exhaustively discussed in the
Slaughter House Cases, and upon
this point there was the greatest
divergence of opinion.
Justice MILLER, speaking for the
majority of the Court, cites the
cases of Corfieldv. Coryell (1823),
4 Wash. C. C. 371; Wardv. Maryland (1871), 12 Wall. (79 U. S.)
418, 43o , and Paul v. Virginia
(r869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) S68,i8o,
to show that the fundamental
rights of citizens of all free governments belong to that classwhich
the State governments were created

to establish and secure.
"With the exception of a few restrictions," says the learned justice, "the entire domain of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined,
lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and
without that of the Federal Government. Was it the purposeofthe
Fourteenth 'Amendment, by the
simple declaration that no State
should abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United
States, to transfer the security and
protection of all the civil rights
which v¢e have mentioned, from
the States to the Federal Government? * * * And where it is
declared that Congress shall have
the power to enforce that article,
was it intended to bring within the
power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore
belonging exclusively to the States ?
All this and more must follow if
the proposition of the plaintiffs in
error be sound ": SlaughterHouse
Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.)3o,
77The Court having demonstrated
that to the States belong the exclusive domain of civil rights, proceeds
to enumerate some of the privileges
and immunities that belong to a
citizen of the United Statesas such.
Among them are the right of access to the seat of government,
seaports and treasuries, land offices
and courts of justice; the right to
demand the protection of the Government when on the high seas, or
in a foreign country; the right of
petition and the privilege of the
writ of habeascorpfus.
It was on this point that the
most radical differences existed between the majority and the minority of the Court. Justice FIELD
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expresses his dissent from these
views in the following terms;
"The Amendment does not attempt
to confer any new privileges or im-"
munities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existiug. It assumes that there are such
privileges and immunities which
belong of right to citizens as such,
and ordains that they shall not be
abridged by State legislation. If
this inhibition has no reference to
privileges and immunities of this
character, but only refers, as held
by the majority of the Court in
their opinion, to such pyivileges
and immunities as were before its
adoption specially designated in the
Constitution, or necessarily implied
as belonging to citizens of the
United States, itwasa vain and idle
enactment which accomplished
nothing, and most unnecessarily
excited Congress and the people on
its. passage. * * * But if the
Amendment refers to the natural
and inalienable rights which be'long to all citizens, the inhibition
has a profound significance and
consequence ": Slaughter House
Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U.S.), 30,
96.
The learned Justice then points
out that Congress had in the first
section of the Civil Rights Act,
passed before the Fourteenth
Amendment, enumerated some of
the rights intended to be protected
by the Constitution. The rights
thus defined were the natural and
inalienable rights that pertain to
every citizen, and take their origin
from a higher source than governmernt.
Justice BRADLEY concurring in
the opinion of Justice FIErLD, discusses fully the fundamental rights
of the citizen, and maintains that
while a State may regulate those
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rights, it cannot subvert them.
"To say that these rights and immunities attach only to State citizenship and not to citizenship of
the United States, appears to meto
evince a very narrow and insufficient estimate ofconstitutional history, and the rights of men, not to
say the rights of the American people ": Id. ii6.
"The privileges and immunities
of a citizen of the United States,"
says Mr. Justice SWAYNE, "include
among other things, the fundamental rights of life, liberty and
property, and also the rights which
pertain to him by reason of his
membership of the Nation ": Id.
126.

It is interesting to note the preponderant influence of these dissenting opinions in the Slaughter
House Cases upon the subsequent
interpretation of another portion of
thesection. The inhibition against
the denial of the equal protection
of the laws to any.person, is so
comprehensive in its scope, that
the clause relating to "privileges
and immunities" has had little occasion to offerits special protection
to citizens of the United States.
Persons, whether citizens or not,
who deemed their "privileges and
immunities" abridged by the laws
of a State, have claimed "the
equal protection of the laws."
Whether the narrow construction
of the term "privileges and immunities " by the majority of the
Court, has discouraged the invocation of the protection of this clause,
cannot be determined; but the
comparatively few cases involving
its construction is somewhat significant.
In Walker v. Sauvinet (1876), 2
Otto (92 U. S.) go, the Court adheres to its close construction in
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holding that a trial by jury in suits
at common law in the State courts,
is not a privilege or immunity of
National citizenship which the
States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. So,
in Presserv. Illinois (1886), 1x6 U.
S. 252, it was held that the right
voluntarily to associate togetheras a
military company or organization,
or to drill and parade with arms,
without and independent of an Act
of Congress, or law of the State
governing the same, is not an attribute of National citizenship.
And, therefore, the prohibition by
a State of such an act, is not an
abridgement of the privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the
United States.
The Court yielded slightly to the
opinion of the minority in Strauder
v. lVest Virginia (x88o), io Otto
(ioo U. S.) 303. A negro was indicted and convicted by a jury impanelled under the law denying to
colored citizens the right to serve
as jurors. While this case involved
more particularly the construction
of another portion of the section,
STRONG, J., maintains in the
course of his opinion, that the
Amendment secured to a race recently emancipated all the civil
rights that the superior race enjoys.
I holding that the law was unconstitutional, the Court did not say
that the denial of the right to colored citizens to serve as jurors was
a denial of the privileges and the
immunities of a citizen of the
United States, as such. The peculiar application of the Amendment to the colored race seemed to
support the presumption of an exception in favor of the negro.
Ofugler v. Kaasas (1887), 123 U.
S. 623, involves the full and careful consideration of the Fourteenth

Amendment with reference to the
power of a State prohibiting the
sale or manufacture of liquor as a
beverage. The Court speaking by
HARLAN, J., says: "The right to
sell intoxicating liquors is not one
of the rights growing out of citizenship of the United States." The
sale of liquor beingdeclared unlawful by the Legislature, and the prohibition of it held by the Court to
be a valid exercise of the police
power, no person was prevented by
the State law from engaging in a
lawful trade and occupation, and
thus denied a civil right.
It will be seen that the Court is
gradually coming around to the
view that civil rights were guaranteed the citizens of the United
States by the Constitution.
Third: Due Process of Law.
This and the succeeding clause
have been more frequently invoked
than the precedingclause by reason
of their greater universality. This
safe-guard against any unlawful
encroachment upon the personal
rights, is thrown around he citizen
of a State by the Constitutions of
nearly all, if not quite all, of the
several States. The phrase "due
process of law" has therefore been
often construed by the State Courts,
but the Federal decisions on the
Amendment have, of necessity,
been limited to the consideration of
the supposed encroachments by a
State upon the personal rights of
the individual.
The requirement of the Constitution that a person cannot be deprived of his property without due
process of law does not imply that
all trials in the State Courts affecting property of persons, must be by
jury. What is "due process of
law" in the States is regulated by
the law of the State: Walker v.
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Sauvinet, supra,page 202.
being the sole judge of what was
injurious to the public health, the
A judge in office by virtue of an
unconstitutional act, is by color of statute was a legitimate exercise of
right an officer de facto; a person
the police power of the State, and
that the Fourteenth Amendment
convicted of a crime by such
officer is not deprived of his liberty was not designed to interfere with
the exercise of that power by the
without due process of law: In re
Ah.Lee (i88o), 5 Fed. Repr. 899.
States. No person was deprived
by the State of his property withA person arrested and imprisoned
under a void ordinance of amunici- out due process of law.
pal corporation, is imprisoned by
In Mugler v. Kansas (1887), 123
the State without due process of U. S. 623, 66o, the Court had said,
law: In re Lee Tong (1883), I8 "It does not follow that every
statute enacted ostensibly for the
Fed. Repr. 253.
promotion of the public morals,
The enforcement by a State, of a
tax under a void law, is a depriva- health or safety, is to be accepted
tion of property without due pro- as the legitimate exercise of the
police powers of a State. * * *
cess of law: Dundee Mfg. Co. v.
The Court is under solemn duty to
Shool Dist. (1884), 19 Fed. Repr.
359. So, a person committed for
look at the substance of things "
If the Court may "look at the subcontempt, for refusing to obey a
subpcena issued by a County At- stance of things," it would seem
torney under authority of a void that the legislature is not the final
act, was restrained of his liberty judge of what may constitute the
police powers of a State, as indi*Withoutdue process of law: In re
cated in the Oleomargarine Case
kebold (1885), 23 Fed. Repr. 791.
(Powellv. Pa.)
An ordinance which provides that
In Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
eVery person who resorts to, or frev. Mackey (i888), 127 U. S. 205,
quents or visits any room or place
where opium is sold or given away, the law under consideration was an
is guilty of misdemeanor, is void. Act of Kansas passed 'in 1874, mak"Such an ordinance," says the ing railroad companies liable for all
Court, "puts an unlawful inhibi- damages to an employee in consetion upon the inalienable rights quence of the negligence of their
agents, or any mismanagement of
and liberties of E citizen; and to
their engineers or any other emcommit him to prison for so doing
is to restrain him of his liberty ployee. The Court held that, in
without due process of law, in vio- this abrogation of the common law
lation of the Fourteenth Amend- rule, the Act did not take the property of railroad companies without
ment": In re Ah Jow (1886), 29
due process of law.
Fed. Repr. 181.
In Painter v. McMahon (I8go),
In Powell v. Pennsylvania(1888),
133 U. S. 66o, the plaintiff contends
i27 U. S. 678, the Court decides
that Chapter 231 of the laws of the
what constitutes due process of law.
The statute of Pennsylvania pro- State of New York relating to taxhibited the manufacture or sale of ation, is unconstitutional, as deany oleaginous substance designed
priving him of his liberty and property without due process of law, in
to take the place of butter. The
Court held that the Iegislature,
that he had no notice nor oppor-
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tunity to be heard, or to examine
or cross-examine witnesses, or any
of the protections offered under a
judicial trial upon the merits.
"The phrase ' due process of law,'"
says Chief Justice FULLER, " does
not necessarily mean a judicial
proceeding."
The nation from
whom we import the phrase 'due
process of law,' said this Court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Mmz._ ,
has never relied upon the courts of
justice for the collection of her
taxes, * * * . The imposition of
taxes is in its nature administrative
and not judicial, but assessors exercise quasi judicial powers in arriving at the value, * * *."
But
the fact that the law permitted the
plaintiff to object to the assessment
and that assessors had quasijudicial
powers. leads the Court to hold
that the plaintiff was not deprived
of his property without due process
of law. And so in Bell's Gap R.
R. Co. v. Pennsylvania(i8go), 134
U. S. 232, it was said that the process of taxation involves no violation of due process of law, when it
is exercised accordingto customary
form and established usages.
In Eilenbecker et al. v. Dist.
Court (i8go), 134 U. S. 31, the District Court of Plymouth County
sentenced the plaintiff in error to
imprisonment in the county jail,
for contempt in refusing to obey a
writ of injunction issued by that
Court, enjoining and restraining
the defendants from selling or
keeping for sale intoxicating liquors. The question was, whether
or not the summary punishment
for contempt by the Court, was a
deprivation of the liberty of defendants without due process of law.
MILLER, J., speaking for the Court
says, " that this proceeding * * *
is due process of law, and is the
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process or proceeding by which
Courts have, from times immemorial, enforced the execution
of their orders and decrees, and
cannot be said to deprive the parties
of their liberty or property without
due process of law."
In Chicago, 1X. & St. P. Ry. Co.
v. .finnesota (i8go), 134 U. S. 418,
the Court held that the Act of Minnesota, passed March 7, 1887. creating a railroad and warehouse commission, and making the decision
of the commission final and conclusive as to whai were reasonable
charges, was unconstitutional, as it
deprived the railroad company of
the right to a judicial investigation
by due process of law. And this
decision was reaffirmed in Minneapolis Eastern Ry. Co. v. State
(1890), 134 U. S. 467.
Fourth: Equal Protection of the
Laws.
The term "equal protection of
the laws," has not the wide application supposed by many of
those who have claimed the benefits
of this inhibition against the power
of the State. The majority of the
decisions involving a construction
of this clause have been adverse to
the parties who have deemed themselves oppressed by discriminating
legislation. The failure to secure
the supposed benefits of this provision has been due, in most instances, to the inability to recognize the fact that laws of a special
character are not necessarily a denial of the equal protection of the
laws.
In Claybrookv. Owensboro(i88o),
16 Fed. Repr. 297, an Act of the
Legislature of Kentucky, authorized a municipal corporation to
levy a tax for the benefit of the
public schools within its limits;
directing that the tax collected
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'from wh'te people should be used
to sustain schools for white chilklren only, and the tax collected
from colored people should be used
to sustain schools for colored children. The Court held that the unqqual benefits of the taxation was
a denial of the equal protection of
the laws, and that the Act was
void.
In Bowman v. Lewis (188o), II
-Otto (ior U. S.) 22, the protection
of this clause of the Amendment
was invoked by a white citizen of
the'United States, and its applicafibn sought to be extended to prevent. a State from arranging and
parceling out the jurisdiction of its
several courts as it saw fit. Mr.
Justice BRADLEY, in the opinion
says, the Fourteenth Amendment
"contemplates persons and classes
persons.
It has not respect to
local or municipal regulations that
do not injuriously affect or discriminate between persons or classes of
persons within the places or municipalities for which such regulalations are made."
. The case of Barbier v. Connelly
(1885), 113 U. S. 27, is most frequently cited in this connection.
A municipal ordinance of San
Francisco provided, among other
things, that no person owning or
'employed in a public laundry,
should wash or iron clothes between
'the hours of io P. M. and 6 A. M.
IAfter remarking that the Amendment, broad as it is, is not designed
tb-interfere with the police power
of the State, FIELD, J:, says,
" Class legislation, discriminating
against some and favoring others,
is prohibited, but legislation which,
in carrying out a public purpose,
is limited in its application, if
within the sphere of its operation
it affects alike all persons similarly

situated, is not within the Amendment."
In the Stockton Laundry Case
(1886), 36 Fed. Repr. 611, an ordinance of the city of Stockton, California, made it an offense for any
person to carry on a laundry
within the habitable portion of the
city, on the ground that it was
dangerous to public health and
safety. The Court held that this
ordinance was an absolute prohibition of a useful employment, and
a denial of the equal protection of
the laws.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886),
118 U. S. 356, and supra, page 196,
a similar state of facts existed. An
ordinance of the city of San Francisco gave the Boardof Supervisors
authority, at their discretion, to
refuse permission to carry on laundries, except those located in stone
or brick buildings. The Court
held the ordinance unconstitutional, in that it gave the Board
arbitrary power to grant or withhold permission to a person or class
of persons to engage in a lawful
business in any place. The Court
distinguishes the case from Barbier
v. Connelly, supra; in the latter
case, the ordinance in question,
prohibiting washing and ironing
in public places between certain
hours of the day, was held to be
purely a police regulation. All
persons coming within its provisions being treated alike, and subject to the same restrictions, the
ordinance was not within the inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ordinance in the
Yick Wo case was,, on its face, a
denial of the equal protection of
the laws, and the facts in the case
demonstrated that the ordinance
was exclusively and unjustly administered against a particular
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class of persons.
In the principal case (Crowleyv.
Christensen,supra,) the Court distinguishes between the case at bar
and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, sul ra.
The restrictive nature of thc
words "within its jurisdiction,"
was first defined in the case of Fire
Association v. New York (1886),
ii9 U. S. iio, thus: A State imposing a heavier burden upon a
foreign corporation than upon its
own corporations of like character,
does not come within the provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment
providing that "no State shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." A foreign corporation not
having complied with the laws of
the State of New York, was not a
person "within the jurisdiction" of
the State, and therefore could not
claim the "equal protection of the
laws."
The same question arose in Penbina &c. Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania (I888), 125 U. S. I81. An
Act of Pennsylvania required foreign corporations not investing
their capital within the State, to
pay a license for keeping an office
within the State. The Court says:
"The inhibition ofthe Amendment,
that no State shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of tke
protection ofthe laws, was designed
to prevent any person or class of
persons from being singled out as a
special subject for discrimination
and hostile legislation. Under the
designation 'person'
there is no
doubt that a private corporation is
included. * * * * The equal
protection of the laws which these
bodies may claim, is only such as
is accorded to similar associations
within the jurisdiction of the State.
The plaintiff in error is not a cor-

poration within the jurisdiction of
Pennsylvania. The State is not
prohibited from discriminating in
the privileges that it may grant to
foreign corporations, as a condition
of their doing business within its
limits, provided always such discrimination does not interfere with
any transactions by such corporations of interstate or foreign commerce."
In Hayes v. State of Missouri
(1887), 120 U. S. 68, the statutes of
Missouri provided that in all capital cases, the State should be allowed eight (8) peremptory challenges, except that, in case of cities
of ioo,ooo inhabitants or over, the
number of challenges might be increased to fifteen (i5). -It was held
that such a provision did not deprive one indicted for murder in the
Criminal Court of St. Louis, of the
equal protection ofthe laws. "The
Fourteenth Amendment,"
says
FrEID, J., "to the Constitution of
the United States, does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either
in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within
which it is to be operated. It merely
requires that all persons subjected
to such legislation shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and
oonditions; both in the privileges
conferred, and in the liabilities imposed."
In Powell v. Pennsylvania(1888),
127 U. S. 678, the Court says thatthe
Oleomargarine Act, "doesnot deny
to any person the equal protection
of the laws, because it places under
the same restrictions, all who manufacture or sell the article embraced within its prohibition, thus
recognizing and preserving the
principles of equality among those
engaged in the same business."
And so in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.
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v.Mlacke (i888), 127 U. S. 205,"this

objection seems to rest upon the
theory that legislation which is
special in its character, is necessarily within the constitutional
prohibition, but nothing can be
further from the fact."
This review of the cases involving the construction of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, bears witness to the fact that
thd Court was fully justifiedin its
fears expressed in the Slaughter
HouseCases as to its results. "The
far-reaching and pervading consequences" are indicated in the enlarged applicability of the Amendment to all persons and classes of
persons. Without disregarding the
universality of its provisions, the
Court, in the evident hope of escaping the responsibility devolving
upon them, call attention to the
fact that the Amendment was particularly designed to ameliorate the
condition of the colored people.

Attention cannot be diverted in
this manner from the general adaptation of its provisions to every
citizen, whether white or black.
The door was opened a little way
in the SlaughterHouse Cases, and
since that time, new questions, and
new phases of old questions, have
forced themselves into the opening. The Fourteenth Amendment
has come to be another Bill of
Rights, fitted for all time and
adapted to meet every emergency
affecting civil liberty of the citizen.
Until the respective domains of
government and of the citizen have
been accurately defined, and the
conflicting interests of organized
society and its unit, the individual,
have been finally settled, the Fourteenth Amendment will afford to
every citizen the opportunity to
present his claims before the highest tribunal in the land.
C. H. CHILDS.
Minneapolis, Minn.

THI FOURTEUNTH AmUNDMENT marks the culmination of the struggle
for the supremacy of the Nation over the States: 28 A=tRicAN LAw
RImIsTR 133.
Assessment of benefits for opening streets prevented by this Amendment, unless compensation be made for the land taken: Id. 123.
Chinese queues protected from being cut off under prison regulations,
as a violation of the equal protection of the laws: z8 Id. 676.
Class egislation is restrained by this Amendment: Id. 684.
Direct legislationby Congress is not authorized by this Amendment:
22 Id. 790.
Discrimination against negro and other races only partially restrained: 3 o Id. 69.
Due process of law means law of the land: 25 Id. 785.
Habitualdrunkards are protected by this Amendment from confinement in an asylum : 27 Id. 693.
Insolvent laws cannot operate extra-territorially without depriving nonresident creditors of their property without! due process of law": Id.
611.

Judgments rendered in Personam, but without personal service, are
rendered without "due process of law ": Id. 614, 615, 620.
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United States Circuit Court, Northern Distrid of
Califoria.
IN RE CHRISTENSEN.
The Circuit Courts of the United States have discretion, in the absence
of special circumstances, to refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus, to take
a prisoner out of the custody of the State courts until after trial and conviction, although the detention is alleged to be in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Where a person in the custody of a State court prays an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground of violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States by his detention, and the State
judges refuse to allow his appeal, and there is no Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States at hand to apply to, a Circuit justice will issue
a habeascorpus and remand or release the prisoner as the law may appear.

Petition for a writ of Habeas Cor,us to the Chief of Police
of the City and County of San Francisco.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the
Supreme Court (supra, p. 9o-3).
.Alfred Clarke, for the petitioner.
Dazzis Louderback, contra.

SAWYER, C. J., September 4, 189o. I am always extremely desirous of avoiding any interference with the State
courts in the execution of the laws, or what purport to be
the laws, of the State, and do not interfere when the circumstances are such that I can find it consistent with my duty
to decline action, till the State courts have, at least, had an
opportunity to act.
In Er parte Royall (1886), 117 U. S. 241, the Supreme
Court, while holding that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction
by writ of habeas coipus, to take a prisoner out of the custody of the State courts at any stage of the proceeding,

when alleged to be held in "violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and to summarily determine the

same, further held, that where there were no special circumstances to influence its action, it had the discretion to decline
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to interfere till tlte State courts could -try the case, and even
-after trial and, conviction, till an appeal or writ of error,
where an appeal or writ of error lies, could be taken to the
United States Supreme Court, and the constitutionality of
• the law be there regularly determined in the ordinary course
.'of judicial proceeding. This decision gave to the circuit
courts and judges in such matters, a much wider discretion
"thAn I had before supposed was vested in them.
The petitioner in this case, applied to me about a year
ago, for a writ of habeas cormus, to discharge him from arrest
under the same ordinance now involved in this case. Acting upon the decision in ExparteRoyal, I declined to issue
-the writ, not because I did not suppose it was otherwise a
proper case for a writ, but because I saw no special circum'stances in the case to require me to act at that time, and I
-,therefore required him to go to the State courts for his
nedy, and to pursue it, as he was entitled to do, by the
"egular course of proceeding on writ of error to the United
:States Supreme Court. The only difference to him would
be iii the channel through which he would reach the court
-'of last resort. I was exceedingly averse to, unnecessarily,
putting myself in antagonism to the courts, and especially
" the higher courts of the State, over whose action I had no
appellate jurisdiction in the ordinary course of proceedings
in the administration of the laws.
He went to the State courts, and after something like a
H
year's litigation, as the petition and record show, the ordiiance 'now in question under which he was held, was, by a
dizided court, declared to be valid not only under the Constitution and laws of the State, but also that it violated no
provisiqn of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
. and he was remanded to custody. The record further shows,
that after this decision, the petitioner applied to the Chief
* Justic of the Supreme Court of the State for the allowance
pf a writ of error, but that the Chief Justice, notwithstand'ing the fact that the decision was rendered by a divided
";*urt, refused to allow the writ, in consequence of which he
was deprived of the right guarantied to him by the Consti-
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tution and laws of the United States, to have the question
as to whether the ordinance does violate the Constitution or
laws of the United States, reviewed by the Supreme Court
of the United States-the tribunal having the jurisdiction
to ultimately and authoritatively determine the constitutionality and validity of the ordinance in this particular. The
Justice of the Supreme Court allotted to this circuit being
absent in Europe, he cannot apply to him for an allowance
of the writ of error, and he is now utterly without remedy,
unless it can be had on this writ.
Under these circumstances, I do not feel at liberty under
the laws of the United States, and under the decision in Ex
pare Royall, to further decline to issue the writ, and, summarily, examine the case, even though it devolves upon me
in the exercise of this jurisdiction imperatively imposed upon
me, to review, and, however unpleasant it may be to me, if
the ordinance is found to be unconstitutional, overrule the
decision of the highest court of the State.
The ordinance requires that every party selling liquors at
retail shall pay for and take out a "license at a specified
rate," and that, "after January I, 1886, no license as a 'retail liquor dealer ' * * * shall be issued by the collector
of licenses, unless the person desiring the same shall have obtained the written consent of a majority of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City and County of San Francisco, to carry on said business; but in case of a refusal of
such consent, upon application, said Board of Police Commissioners shall grant the same upon the written recommendation of not less than twelve citizens of San Francisco, owning
real estate in the block or square in which said business of
'retail liquor dealer'

*

*

*

is to be carried on."

It

further makes it a misdemeanor to violate any of the provisions of the ordinance
It also appears in the record, that the petitioner tendered
the amount of his license fee, and requested the written consent of a majority of the Police Commissioners to the issue
thereof, and it was refused; that there were not twelve ciiizens of San Francisco owning real estate in the block or
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square in which he desired to carry on his business as a liquor
dealer, and that it was therefore impossible to obtain the assent of twelve such citizens, and that a license was
consequently refused; that proceeding with his business
long before established, lie was again arrested for violation of
said ordinance, and. he -isnow in custody in pursuance of
such arrest.
I am myself, after due consideration, unable to take the
case out of the rule laid down in the second head-note to the
decision in Yick Wo v. Hob kins, and o Lee v. Hoki'ns
(I886), 118 U. S. 356, which reads:
A municipal ordinance to regulate the carrying on of public laundries
within the limits of the municipality, violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, if it confers upon the municipal authorities
arbitrary power, at their own will, and without regard to discretion in the
legal sense of the term, to give or withholdconsent as to persons or'places,
with regard to the competency of the persons applying, or to the propriety
of place selected, for the carrying on of the business.

In commenting upon the view of the Supreme Court of
California, that the ordinance then 'in question vested "in
the Board of Supervisors a not unusual discretion, in grant•ing or withholding their assent to the use of wooden buildings as laundries, to be exercised in reference to the circumstances of each case, in view of the protection of the public
against fire," the United States Supreme Court in that case,
said, on page 366, 118 U. S.:
We are not able to concur in that interpretation of the power conferred
upon the Supervisors. There is nothing in the ordinance which points
to such regulation of the business of keeping or conducting laundries.
They seem intended to confer, and actually do confer, not a discretion to
be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but
a naked and arbilrary power to give or withhold consent, not only as
to places but as to persons. * * * The power given to them is not
coxifided to their discretion, in the legal sense of that term, but it is granted
to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither
ghidafice nor restraint.

The language quoted is just as applicable to this ordinance
as to that, then under consideration. In that ordinance it
was made unlawful for "any person or persons to establish,
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maintain or carry on a laundry within the corporate limits
of the City and County of San Francisco, without having
first obtained the consent of the Board of Supervisors," etc.,
and in the ordinance in this case, it is made unlawful for any
person to carry on the business of a liquor dealer without a
license, which could only be obtained upon the '-written
consent of a majority of the Board of Police Commissioners,"
or in default of that, upon the "written recommendation of
twelve citizens," having property in the block or square
where the business is desired to be carried on. What difference is there in the provisions of the two ordinances, except
that the consent in the laundry ordinance is to be by the
Board of Supervisors themselves, while in the liquor ordinance, the power to consent or reject is delegated by the
Board of Supervisors to the Police Commissioners, or to
twelve citizens of the block. If the Board of Supervisors
could not c(nfer upon, or reserve to itself this unregulated
arbitrary power, it certainly, could not confer it upon the
Police Commissioners, or upon private parties having no
official relations whatever to the subject matter.
In the Case of W/o Lee (1886), II Saw. 429, 26 Fed. Repr.
471, this Court differed from the State Supreme Court upon
the same point decided in Yick W7. v. Hofikins, and gave
its reasons for so doing at length, but in deference to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of California, it yielded its
own convictions, and remanded the petitioner, thinking it
more seemly that the question between the State and the
National courts should be authoritatively settled by the
United States Supreme Court, on appeal, than to bring these
subordinate courts into antagonism. The result was, both
cases went to the Supreme Court of the United States. That
Court quoted largely from the opinion of this Court, and approved its views. It consequently reversed the judgment
of the Circuit Court, as it did of the Supreme Court of California, which this Court had followed: Yick Wo v. Hofikins
(1886), 118 U. S. 356. The decision of Justice FIELD in the
Laundiy Ordinance Case (1882), 7 Saw. 531, 13 Fed. Repr.
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is also in point, and to the same effect. See n re Wo
Lee (I886), 1I Saw. 429, 26 Fed. Repr. 471.
It is sought by counsel for the City, as was attempted by
the State Supreme Court, to distinguish this case from the
Laundry Ordinance Case cited, on the ground that the laundry business is a necessary business, and cannot be wholly
suppressed, but only regulated, for the purposes of securing
safety from fires; while selling liquors is supposed to be injurious to society per se, and may be wholly prohibited or
permitted upon such conditions as may be prescribed-that
the power to absolutely prohibit, necessarily includes the
power to impose any terms or conditions, however arbitrary,
no matter what, less than absolute prohibition, and consequently, that the power to grant or refuse a license may be
delegated to the arbitrary and unregulated will of one or
more persons, official or unofficial. I cannot as at present
advised, assent to this proposition. This ordinance does not
limit or regulate, or purport to limit or regulate the sale of
liquors. It would seem to be upon its face-like other license ordinances-a mere revenue measure. It does not prohibit the sale of liquors, or limit their sale to any particular
portion of the City, or to any number of persons, nor prescribe any qualifications whatever which shall be necessary to
entitle a party to a license, or prescribe any conditions or
characteristics which shall constitute a disqualification, and
debar one from obtaining a license. It is not a matter of
Tegulation at all. It simply provides that no license shall
issue to any party unless he obtained the written consent of
a majority of the Police Commissioners, or of twelve property holders in the same block, without indicating any conditions whatever upon which the assent may or ought to be
given, or withheld. It leaves it to the absolute arbitrary, unregulated will of the persons named. -They can consent to
grant a license to every vagabond and disreputable person in
the City, and refuse to consent to a license to every respectable person in the City. The ordinance permits and authorizes such action. It puts it in the absolute, arbitrary power
of these persons, to control the whole retail liquor trade of
229,
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the City-without regard to qualifications of the parties seeking a license, or to circumstances or conditions, or the interests of society. In my judgment, an ordinance that upon its*
face permits and authorizes such discrimination and inequality of operation, is a violation of the Constitution of the
United States. I admit the full power of the State to prohibit, limit and control the domestic liquor traffic, and to
prescribe the qualifications and conditions applicable to all
of those who are to be permitted to sell liquors, but this is a
very different proposition from that which claims the authority to confer upon any one or more persons the arbitrary
power in accordance with their uncontrolled will, to regulate
these matters. It is not unlawful to deal in liquors or
sell liquors at retail in California, or San Francisco,
any more than it is to keep a laundry, which business also pays a license. The record shows that there
are between three thousand and four thousand licensed
retail liquor dealers in San Francisco. It is only made unlawful to sell liquors when you cannot obtain the written
consent of a certain number of men whose action in yielding or withholding their consent is influenced by no qualifications or consideration other than their own arbitrary will,
governed, perhaps, by prejudice or other unworthy motives.
And that was one of the grounds upon which the laundry
ordinance under consideration, was expressly and directly
held by the United States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. The police powers are the powers which come into
play in the licensing and regulating of both occupations.
And in both instances they operate upon the same legal
principles, and they should have a similar equal and uniform
application.
Under this ordinance the Police Commissioners, for anything in its provisions to restrain them, might consent to
the license, as retail liquor dealers, of every immoral person
in the City, while consent might be withheld from every
person who is respectable and suitable for the business.
If they do not do this, it is not because they are restrained
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by any provisions of this ordinance. These provisions permit it.
In the Case of the Laundry Ordinancecited, it appeared
it is true, that the gross discriminations, which the ordinance permitted, were in fact made, in its administration.
These arrests for such gross discriminations, were doubtless
illegal on that ground also. But the discriminati6ns in fact
made, cannot affect the validity of the ordinance itself. The
ordinance was declared void, because it permitted a discrimination, not merely because its permission was in fact made
available in practice. The validity of an ordinance must be
determined by its terms, by what it authorizes, not by the
manner of its execution. It is valid or invalid, irrespective
of the manner in which it is, in fact, administered. Its
capability of being abused is the test
In the case of the ordinance now in question no evidence
was introduced as to the way in which it has been, in fact,
administered. The case was argued, submitted, and decided
upon the character, terms and provisions of the ordinance
itself.
But the mode of its administration would be irrelevant to
the point decided, as the question is, as to the validity of
the ordinance itself, as it appears upon its face; and not
whether it has been honestly or dishonestly administered.
The fact that it permits arbitrary discriminations and abuses
in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated, arbitrary will of
certain designated persons, is the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested. That there are likely to be abuses,
as in the case of the laundry ordinance, both as to individuals
and classes, there is no reason to doubt, when an outburst of
popular prejudice shall demand or countenance it; and it is
also liable to be abused from more unworthy motives, considerations and influences. The ordinance should prescribe
some conditions, qualifications or disqualifications, by which
those who are to issue licenses are to be guided in their
action, other than their own unregulated, arbitrary will.
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After careful consideration, I am unable to take'this ordinance out of the rule laid down in the second head-note in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Wo Lee v. Hofikins (I886), 118 U.
S. 356. As that decision is controlling, so far as this Court
is concerned, I am bound to discharge the petitioner, however willing I might otherwise be to yield my individual
views to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State.
Let the petitioner be discharged.
Should the City desire to appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, an appeal will be gladly granted. The
question has reached such a state, that it is of the utmost importance that it be authoritatively decided. Until so decided
the foregoing views will control the action of this Court.
(Reversed on appeal, szora, page 19o.)
The first part of the preceding
opinion by Judge SAWYER, raises
the important practical question as
to the time whcn a writ of habeas
corpNus will be issued by the United
States courts for the relief of persons claiming the protection of the
Constitution and laws of the United
States against the action of State
officials and courts. It is true that
it is provided (Rev. Stat. U. S.) :
" 755. The court, or justice, or
judge to whom such application is
made, shall forthwith award a writ
of habeascorpius, unless it appears
from the petition itself that the
party is not entitled thereto. The
writ shall be directed to the person
in whose custody the party is detained."
But it is also true that these words
are modified, in their practical
application, by another section of
the same Thirteenth Chapter of the
Revised Statutes, wherein there is
this direction:
" ? 761. The court, or justice, or
judge shall proceed, in a summary
way, to determine the facts of the
case, by hearing the testimony and

arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice
require."'
Upon the concluding words of
this section, Justice HARLAN remarked that "What law and justice
may require, in a particular case,,
is often a.n embarrassing question
to the court, or to the judicial
officer before whom the petitioner
is brought," notwithstanding that
"if, however, it is apparent from
the petition, that the writ, if issued,
ought not, on principles of law and
justice, to result in the immediate
discharge of the accused from custody, the court is not bound to
award it as soon as the application
is made": Exparte Royall (1886),
117 U. S. 241, 250, citing Exparte
Walkins (i83o), 3 Pet. (28 U. S.)
193, 201, and Ex parle Milligan
(1866), 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 2, III.
A little further on, the same learned
Justice continued: -The injunction to hear the case summarily,
and thereupon 'to dispose of the
party as law and justice require,'
does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in
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which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion
should be exercised in the light of
the relations existing under our
system .of government, between
the judicial tribunals of the Union
and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public
good requires that these relations
be not disturbed by unnecessary
conflict between courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights
secured by the Constitution": Id.
2.51.
That there might be no uncertainty, Justice HARLAN concluded:
"That these salutary principles
[for avoiding conflicts between
State and United States cburts]
may have full operation, and in
harmony with what we suppose
was the intention of Congress in
the enactments in question, this
Court holds that where a person is
in custody under process from a
State court of original jurisdiction,
from an alleged offense against the
laws of such State, and it is claimed
that he is restrained of his liberty,
in violation of the Constitution of
the United States, the Circuit Court
has a discretion, whether it will discharge him upon habeas corpus, in
advance of his trial in the court in
which he is indicted: that discretion, however, to be subordinated
to any special circumstances requiring immediate action. When the
State Court shall have finally acted
upon the case, the Circuit Court
has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted,
shall be put to his writ of error
from the highest court of the State,
or whether it will proceed by writ
of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is
restrained of his liberty in violation

of the Constitution of the United
States. The latter was substantially
the course adopted in Ex parle
Bridges [infra, page 222]": Id.
252-3.

This case of Ex parle Royall
was a two-fold application for relief from imprisonment for selling
a Virginia bond coupon without a
State license and from custody,
pending trial under another indictment for the same kind of action.
The United States Circuit Court refused to release Royall upon the
habeas corpus, putting him to his
appellate remedies.
Classificationof Cases.
There are two classes of persons
who may apply for this writ; those
claiming immunity from their
official relations with the United
States, as In re Neagle (1889), 39
Fed. Repr. 833 (S. C. 28 AMERICAN
LAW PmGISTER 585), and Cunningham v. Neagle (189o), 135 U. S. I
(S. C. 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTE1R

658); and those, like Christensen
in the principal case, merely demanding protection as citizens or
persons entitled to Constitutional
guarantees. "It is not now the
law, therefore, and never was, that
every person held in unlawful imprisonment, has a right to invoke
the aid of the courts of the United
States for his release by the writ of
habeas corpus. In order to obtain
the benefit of this writ, and to procure its being issued by the court
or justice or judge who has a right
to order its issue, it should be made
to appear, upon the application for
the writ, that it is founded upon
some matter which justified the exercise of Federal authority, and
which is necessary to the enforcemnent of rights under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States ": MILiLER, J., Inre Burrus
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(i89O), 136 U. S. 586, 591, a case
where the writ was refused, because
intended to restore an infant to her
father from unlawful detention by
her grandparents. Similarly, Ex
tarle Eve,-s (1858), U. S. C. Ct. S.
D. Ohio, I Bond 197 ; S. C. 7 AzaERICAN LAW REGISTER (0. S.) 79.
Not only are there these two
general classes of persons, but what
is more to the particular point here
under consideration, the writ of
habeas corpus has been issued at
different times in the case of each
class.
United States Offleers,
The Neagle case (1889-9 o , reported in 39 Fed. Repr. 833 and
x35 U. S. r (also in full in 28
AMERICAN LA
REGISTER 585
and 29 Id. 658.) is the last of those
where officers of the United States
have released. The writ was issued
as soon as Neagle had been committed by the Justice of the Peace
at Stockton upon the preliminary
hearing, charged with the murder
of Terry. Neagle was discharged
without further hearing or trial in
the State courts. The ground of
this discharge was the justification
of Neagle's acts in defendingJustice
FIELD, by the laws of the United
States, and consequently the laws
of California must yield to the
supreme laws of the land, that it
would be useless for the State authorities to try Neagle. The dissent of Justice LAMAR (with whom
Chief Justice FULLER concurred)
did not go to the ground of the discharge at all.
Ramsay's case (1879), reported
in 2 Flip. 451 (see 28 AMiERICAN
LAW REGISTER 651), shows equal
promptness in relieving a Deputy
United States Marshal, who had
shot a prisoner in self defense.
Upon Ramsey's arrest by the State

authorities, he was brought up by
a habeas corpus from the United
States District Court, and after-full
hearing released by that Court.
The State authorities then indicted
Ramsey formurder, and the United
States Court again released him
before trial. The State court then
took advantage of Ramsey's presence in the State court and ordered
him into custody, from which the
United States Court again immediately. released him, with the remark that "having jurisdiction,
the decision of this Court is binding upon the State courts. * *"
This action of the United States
Judge was expressly grounded
upon the Jenkins cases and Coleman v. Tennessee (1879), 7 Otto (97
U. S.) 509. The same Judge [BALLARD] had shown equal promptness
in U. S. ex rel. Weeden et al.
(x877), U. S. C. Ct. D. Ky. 2 Flip.
76, for the relief of the deputies
who merely witnessed the fatal
shooting; and in U. S. ex rel.
Roberts v. TheJailer (1867), Id. 2
Abb. 265, for the release of deputies
killing in self defense.
Where a soldier of the United
States Army had killed an escaping
bushwhacker under the orders ofhis
superior, February 2, 1865, and
was afterwards tried by the State
court for murder, convicted, sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, and had served ten months
of his sentence, he was immediately
released on application: On petition of Hurst (1879), U. S. D. Ct.
Mid. D. Tenn., 2 Flip. 51o.
Equally prompt was the release
in Ex parle Sifford (1857), U. S.
D. Ct. D. Ohio, 5 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER (0. S.) 659, and Ex
parteRobinson (1855), Id. 6 McLean
355, both cases arising out of the
Fugitive Slave Law. This prompt-

IN

R

CHRISTENSEN.

ness was in accordance with the
precedent set for such cases
by Justice GRMR in Ex parte
Jenkins (1853), U. S. C. Ct.
E. D. Pa. (reported in 2 Wall.
J. 521 ; 2 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 0. S. '44; and 3 Id.
208, 227. See also 28 Id. 637-9.)
The same promptness was used by
MILLER, J., in U. S. ex rel. Garlandv. Morris (1854), U. S. D. Ct.
D. Wis., 2 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER (0. S.) 348. Notwithstanding
the release of Marshal Robinson in
1855, with the remark by Justice
MCLEAN, "A sense of duty compels me to say, that the proceedings of the honorable [State]
Judge were not only without the
authority of law, but against law,
and that the proceedings are void,
and I am bouud to treat them as a
nullity." (6 McLean 365) -the
Marshal was again arrested (1856)
in a fugitive slave case, and again
immediately released: i Bond 39;
s. C. 4 AmERICAN LAW REGISTER
617.
Election Cases.
As United States Supervisors of
Elections for Representatives in
Congress, have power to arrest
without warrant, any person interfering with an orderly registration
of the voters, such an officer will
be released at once if arrested by
State authority under a charge of
assault and battery for his manual
seizure during registration of a
disorderly voter: Expare Geissler
(x88o), U. S. C. Ct. N. D. IM., 4
Fed. Repr. 188. Under the same
power to arrest summarily for illegal voting, an immediate release
was ordered of a special Deputy
United States Marshal, in Exfparte.
Morrill(1888), U. S. C. Ct. D. Oregon, 35 Fed. Repr. 261.
The immediate release of the

United States Marshal and District
Attorney was ordered in Exparle
Turner (1879), U. S. C. Ct. Mid. D.
Alabama, 3 Woods 603, where they
had been conimtited by the City
Court of Selma in that State, for
contempt in not producing the
papers relating to the election of a
Representative in Congress, The
papers were in the hands of the petitioners as lawful custodians for
the United States Grand Jury, and
the State court could not, therefore,
require them to produce the papers.
The Case of the Electoral College
of South Carolina, heard in the
United States Circuit Court at
Columbia, November, 1876, is also
an illustration of the application of
this writ to cases of counting and
certifying ballots for Presidential
elector3 and members of Congress.
The State Supreme Court had adjudged the petitioners in contempt,
but the United States Court held
the whole proceeding void, and released the petitioners. An anonymous and hostile review of this
action of Judge BoND appeared as a
leading article in the AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER for March, 1877
(Vol. XV, pages 129-148), but the
right to issue the habeascorpus at
the time it was issued, was not
questioned. The objection made
by the anonymous writer, that the
voting for both State and Congressional candidates at one time ought
not to give jurisdiction to the
United States Court, has since
been settled in favor of that jurisdiction: In re Coy (1887), 127 U.
S. 731, and 29 AMERICAN LAW
RZGISTER 349Revenue Officers.
The case of Corporal Lemuel J.
Davis, of the Eighteenth Infantry,
arose in 1876, by his detail in February of that year, as one of a
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guard to aid a Deputy United
States Marshal in making an arrest
for violation of the internal revenue laws of the United States. By
an accident, Davis' piece was discharged, mortally wounding the
party to be arrested. Davis was
indicted in the State court for
murder, and entered into a recognizance to appear for trial. He
was then released by a habeas corpius from the United States Circuit
Court for the District of South
Carolina : Davisv. South Carolina
(1883), 107 U. S. 597. The case
was removed from the State court,
under 643 Rev. Stat. U. S., at the
time of the issuing of the habeas
corpus, and finally reached the
Supreme Court on account of the
State courts persisting to assert
jurisdiction contrary to law. Of
the validity of the law there was
admittedly no doubt, after the decision in Tennessee v. James Of!.
Davis (i88o), ioo U. S. 257 (see
28 AMERICAN LA.w REGISTER 649).
It is true that the wording of
643 Rev. Stat. U. S. required application for removal and a habeas
the
corlpus curn causa, "before
trial or final hearing" in the State
court, but the cases are still valuable which arose under that section,
because there are several steps "before the trial or final hearing," and
the action of the United States
court has always been as prompt to
relieve the revenue officer as the
State laws have been invoked for
his arrest. Thus, in State v. Port
(i88o), U. S. C. Ct. N. D. Ga., 3
Fed. Repr. 117, as soon as the deputies had been arrested for murdering an illicit distiller, or "moonshiner," and before any hearing,
the cause was removed. The State
objected that-there ought to be delay until an indictment had been

found, but the answer was plain
that " It would be hard to convince
a man who was taken away from
his business and family, and held
in custody by a sheriff, on a lawful
warrant fbr his arrest, duly issued
by ajudicial officer [a justice of the
peace], upon an affidavit duly made
before him, charging him with an
offence against the criminal laws of
the State, that no criminal prosecution had been commenced against
him ": WOODS, C.J., Id. 121. The
defendant was discharg-d: Id. 133.
Similar action, in a similar case,
occurred in the same court, in
State of Georgia v. Bolton (1882),
II Fed. Repr. 217 ; and as soon as
indicted, in a similar case, in Findley v. Satterfield (1877), 3 Woods.
504.
Violators of VationalLaws.
Before passing to the second class
of cases, where civilians are seeking protection against violation of
their Constitutional rights, an intermediate class must be observed.
It embraces persons not acting in
an official capacity, but still the
objects of State action for something done " in pursuance of a law
of the United States." Such persons are within the purview of that
section of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, which provides:
"SEc. 753. The writ of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to a
prisoner in jail, unless where he is
in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States, or is
committed for trial before some
court thereof; or is in custody for
an act done or omitted in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or of
an order, process, or decree of a
court or judge thereof; or is in
custody in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the
United States; or, being a subject

-
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or citizen of a foreign State, and
domiciled therein, is in custody for
an act done or omitted under any
alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection or exemption
claimed under the commission, or
order, or sanction of any foreign
State, or under color thereof, the
validity and effect whereof depend
upon the law of nations ; or unless
it is necessary to bring the prisoner
into court to testify." This section is composed of portions of the
Acts of 1789, 1833, 1842 and 1867,
and its history is partially traced in
28 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER 624-

53The leading case for this release
from custody for a thing done "in
pursuance of a law of the United
States," is that of Eix pare Dock
Bridges, heard at chambers in the
Northern District of Georgia by
Justice BRADLEY, in May, 1875,
and reported at length in 14 AMERICAN LAw REGISTER 566, also in a
less satisfactory form in 2 Woods
428. The act done "in pursuance
of a law of the United States," was
the giving of testimony, before a
United States commissioner under
the enforcement act. The testimony was wilfully untrue, and
therefore, by .5392, Rev. Stat. U.
S., rendered the witness liable to
fine and imprisonment for perjury
at the hands of the United States
judges alone, by p629 and 711,
Rev. Stat. U. S. But this perjury
could not be tried and punished by
the State courts, and the petitioner
having been indicted in the State
court, was discharged from that
prosecution,, though immediately
arrested on a bench warrant for trial
in the United States court.
In re Loner(0889), U.S. C. Ct.
R. D. Va., 38 Fed. Repr. ioi, arose
from the arrest of the petitioner by

a State officer, for perjury in a contested election for a seat in the
House of Representatives of the
United States. This perjury was
an offense against the laws of the
United States, and not of the State,
and the discharge was immediate,
upon the authority of Eli parle
Dock Bridges, supra. On appeal,
this judgment was affirmed in an
interesting opinion by Justice
GRAY, on the co-ordinate jurisdiction of the State courts over such
crimes; on the special point of this
annotation, ExparleDock Bridges
was affirmed: Thomas v. Loney
(1890), 134 U. S. 372.
To the preceding, should be
added criminal cases arising within
bounds which have been ceded by a
State to the United States, together
with jurisdiction over the same, as
Gosport Navy Yard, in Virginia.
Where the petitioner had been
arrested by State authority, for a
murder committed in this navy
yard, he was immediately released
from State jurisdiction: Ex parle
Tatem (1877), U. S. D. Ct. R. D.
Va., i Hughes 588.
Citizens.
In re Spickler was decided October 25, 1890, in the United States
Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa (43 Fed. Repr. 653)
upon an application to relieve from
imprisonment for contempt in violating an injunction restraining the
petitioner from selling intoxicating
liquors. This was an " original
package case" in which the forbidden sales had been made after the
passage of the Wilson bill (printed
in 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 828), and this United States
Statute was construed neither to be
void nor to require the re-enactment of the Iowa prohibitory law.
Hence, the petitioner was re-
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manded. Near the conclusion of
his opinion, Judge SHIRAS said:
"Furthermore, if I entertained a
doubt upon the principal question,
or was in my own mind satisfied
that the State court had erred in its
construction of the law, I should
not feel justified in releasing the
petitioner from the effect of the
judgment of that court. The way
is open to the petitioner to present
the question to the Supreme Court
of the United States by a writ of
error to the State court. * * I
do not question the existence of the
power in the United States circuit
courts to grant writs of habeas carfpus, when it is alleged that a person is deprived of his liberty by
State action, contrary to the provisions of the Federal Constitu-"
tion ; but it is a power to be sparinily exercised. When it appears
that the petitioner is held under
the judgment of a State court of
competent jurisdiction, before this
Court should grant him a discharge, it should be made to appear that the illegality of his detention is beyond fair question;
and in all cases wherein the pivotal
point has not been finally decided
by the Supreme Court, but still
remains a debatable question, the
circuit court should not discharge
the petitioner, for this would be
simply converting the writ of
habeascorus into a writ of error,
by means of which this Court
would be asked to review the
judgment of the State court upon
a debatable question of law arising
under the Federal Constitution, but
which it was the duty of that court
to investigate and decide. In such
cases, the federal question can be
readily presented to the Supreme
Court, and, as there exists this
plain and proper remedy, it should

be followed": Id. 66o-1. This is
in agreement with the principles
laid down in Ex piarte Royall,,
supra, p. 217.
The principle, therefore, of noninterference with the State courts,
divides all applications by civilians
into the two classes of uncertain
declarations and of flagrant violation of Constitutional right.
In the former of these classes, the
United States court will not interfere at all, or will remand the petitioner, as in Sfickler's case (sulpra),
that he may reach the Supreme
Court of the United States by appeal from the highest court of the
State having jurisdiction. This
was done in Ex plare Ulrich
(189o), U. S. C. Ct. W. D. Mo. 43
Fed. Repr. 661, by CALDWELL, C.
J., where the petitioner alleged that
he had been put twice in jeopardy
on a criminal charge of bigamy.
Similarly, where an agent of the
Spickler already mentioned had
been arrested and raised the question of what was an original package, whether the crate containing
a number of bottles, or each bottle
was the original package: Allen v.
Black (189o), U. S. C. Ct. S. D.
Iowa 43 Fed. Repr. 228. All such
cases lie beyond the scope of this
annotation.
The omission of the class of
cases where the right is uncertain,
must be understood to explain the
absence of such cases as Exparle
Hanson (x886), U. S. "D. Ct. D.
Oregon, 28 Fed. Repr. 127, where
the decision of Judge DEADY would
now be esteemed incorrect (see 29
AmERICAN LAwv REGISTER 747,
758), and the State proceeding
there recognized as valid would
now be declared void. None of
the cases omitted in this annotation, however, expressly decide
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anything witli respect to the stage
of the State proceeding at which
the habeas corpus ought to issue.
An exception to the preceding
principle is where the habeascorpus
is used as a writ of error, after final
hearing, as in Barber'scase, where
the writ was issued from the United
States Circuit Court for the District
of Minnesota, upon the petitioner's
commitment to jail after conviction
before ajustice of the peace for having sold fresh beef which had not
been slaughtered within the State
(see 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
807). Judge NELsoN dischargedthe
petitioner: In re Barber, 39 Fed.
Repr. 641, and the State appealed
to the Supreme Court, on the
question of the constitutionality
of the State fresh meat law, only to
fail there: Minnesota v. Barber
(189o), 136 U. S. 313. Similarly,
It re Keminmler (189o), 136 U. S.
436. This class of cases also lies
beyond the scope of this annotation, which is confined to the
enquiry of the point of time, and
not of the jurisdiction for the issuance of a habeas corpus on an allegation of the violation of constitutional rights. The jurisdiction
is here assumed as undeniable, and
its exercise after final hearing in the
State court scarcely presents a separable subject; often the issuance of
the writ is then a matter of speedier
determination than could be obtained by an appeal: Ex parte
Kieffer (1889), U. S. C. Ct. D. Kan.,
4o Fed. Repr. 399. The citation
was another dressed beef case, and
Judge (now Justice) BRE.WER remarked that "At the outset we are
met by this question: Is this a
case in which the writ of habeas
corpus should be allowed, even
though these ordinances [of the City
of Topeka] bedeemed invalid? The

cases of ERx parte Royall (1886);
117 U. S. 241, and ExparteFonda
(1886), Id. 516, affirm that there is
a discretion in the Federal courts
in the matter of habeas corpus,
both before and after trial and
judgment in the State court; and,
in cases in which the act under
which the prosecution is had, is
challenged as in conflict with the
Federal Constitution. The Court,
in one-perhaps both-of these
opinions declares it not to be assumed that the State courts will
not adminster the law correctly,
and accord to the party all the
rights guaranteed to him by the
Federal Constitution. Therefore it
is often the proper way to decline
to allow the writ, leaving the party
to enforce his rights in the State
courts. So, it is argued that, if it
be true that these ordinances re
in conflict witda the Federal Constitution, the petitioner has his
remedy. He can appeal his case
from the police to the district court;
from there to the Supreme Court of
the State; and from thence to the
Supreme Court of the United
States. * * * But that is not
the only consideration. If these
ordinances are invalid, they are invalid because of an attempt to interfere with commerce, and prevent the free exchange of commodities between the citizens of another
State and those of this City. Few
persons can stand the expense of
litigation running through that
channel to the Supreme Court.
Length of time must pass before
the judgment of that Court could
be obtained. In the meantime, if
those ordinances are enforced,-not
only against the petitioneA but
against whoever may see fit to engage in this bpsiness-there is an
interference with the exchange of
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commodities between the citizens
of other States and those of this
City; and the result will be to stop
such traffic. Now, when that would
be the natural result, when that is
declared to be the intended purpose
of this legislation, this Court may,
in the exercise of its discretion,
properly hold, after a case has been
passed to judgment in the State.
court, that the party has a right to
a speedy enquiry and determination
in the Federal court, as to whether
such ordinances are in conflict
with the Constitution of the United
States. The public, as well as the
individual, are interested in a
speedy settlement of this matter":
Id. 4oo-I.
Hence, in a case similar to
Christensen's, the hearing was had
upon an informal rule to show
cause why the habeascorpus should
not issue, to relieve from imprisonment under sentence for selling
liquor without a license. The writ
and the petitioner's discharge were
refused, as license laws did not as a
class violate the Fourteenth Amendment: In re Hoover (x887), U. S.
D. Ct. S. D. Ga., 3o Fed. Repr. 51.
In the second of the two classes
of cases where a civilian applies
for a habeas corpus for a flagrant
violation of the Constitution, are
included many different cases
where the United States courts act
with great promptness, as will now
be exemplified.
Extradition Cases.
In re Reinitz (x889), U. S. C. Ct.
S. D. N. Y., 39 Fed. Repr. 204,
was a hearing upon habeas corpus
of the petitioner, who had been
extradited to New York City from
Queenstown, Ireland, on a charge
of forgery, had been acquitted, and
was arrested in a civil action for
VOT- XXX-I 5
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moneys wrongfully converted to
his own use, as he was leaving the
court house after his acquittal.
The habeas corpus was immediately issued under 752 Rev. Stat.
U. S., and the petitioner was released, as he had not had a reasonable time to return to Ireland before his arrest. This is in strict
agreement with the principles deduced by the late Justice MILLER,
in U. S. v. Renscher (r886), ii9 U.
S. 407, 431, following Ex parle
Royall (1886), 117 Id. 241, 251.
Besides extradition cases proper,
there is a more numerous cliss of
surrender by one State executive
to that of another, which is by
virtue of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and if wrongful, may be remedied by habeas
corpus from the United States
courts. State of Tennessee v. Jackson (1888), U. S. D. Ct. E. D.'
Tenn., 36 Fed. Repr. 258, is a
striking instance of the fraudulent
abuse of this power, and also of
the summary relief to be obtained.
The petitioner .wasdelivered up'by
the Governor of Illinois on a requisition by the Governor of Tennessee, based upon a false affidavit
that the petitioner was a fugitive
from Tennessee, when, in fact, he
had never been in the State. The
case originated in the sale of a
horse, but that is immaterial, as
the action of the Court was based
upon the whole proceeding having
been "a fraud upon the law." As
soon as the petitioner had been
carried into Tennessee and committed to jail for a hearing, the
habeas corpus issued and the release followed. It does not appear
whether the detective who made
the false oath and imposed on both
Governors, suffered the just pun-
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ishment of his crime, or not. The
writ went out quite as promptly in
a case of actual abduction-In re
Mfahon (1888), U. S. D. Ct. D. Ky.,
34 Fed. Repr. 525-but the discharge was refused, as the petitioner had been arrested on his
arrival in the State, by a bench
warrant. The petitioner had taken
part in the Hatfield-McCoy outrages along the West Virginia
border line, and raised no question
of innocency. To much the same
effect is Ex parle Ker (1883), U.
S. C. Ct. D. Ill., iS Fed. Repr. 167,
the petitioner havingbeen abducted
from Peru and carried into California, and from thence removed to
Illinois upon a requisition of the
Governor.
Similarly Ex parle
Brown (1886), U. S. D. Ct. N. D.
N.,Y., 28 Fed. Repr. 653.
The writ issued from the United
States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, as
soon as the petitioner had been
arrested in that State where he was
found: Roberts v. Reilly (1885),
i6 U. S. 8o; though the contention was upon the regularity of the
papers accompanying the requisition: Similarly, Ex parle M71organ (1883), U. S. D. Ct. W. D. Ark.,
20 Fed. Repr. 29§, where the contention was over the right of the
Chief of the Cherokee Nation to
make a requisition.
A commercial traveler was delivered from an awkward position
by this writ, immediately upon his
arrest upon suspicion as a forger
fleeingfrom Kansas. Though there
were no papers and no requisition, a police justice of Richmond, Va., took upon himself to
commit the petitioner to jail, upon
hearsay only, to await action of
the Criminal Court of that City:
Exparle MicKean (1878), U. S. D.

Ct. R.
United

D. Va., 3 Hughes 23States
District Judge
HUGHES, while releasing the petitioner, was, however, so far forgetful of the duty of the courts to
preserve individual liberty, as to
overlook the petitioner's positive
averments in his petition for the
writ, that he was "wholly innocent"; in fact, the release was
ordered for these technical reasons
only: "If the committing magistrate were merely holding this prisoner from day to day, awaiting
such testimony as the law required,
I should remand the prisoner to
him and await his final action; because it is customary, as an act
of comity between States, that, in
such cases, a reasonable time shall
be allowed for sending on the requisite proofs of the crime and of the
charges from the State where the
crime was committed.
But it
seems that the magistrate has taken
final action in the matter, and exhausted the powers intrusted to
him by the State law, so that the
prisoner is before me on the validity of the mitirnis,which is made
part of the return of the jailer of
Richmond to the writ of habeas
corpus": Id. 26.
In respect to arrest upon suspicion, the case just cited had a
counterpart in Ex parle Joseph
Smith (the Mormon Prophet), who
was* arrested in Illinois in 1842
upon a charge of being accessory
before the fact of a murder conmitted in Missouri. There was no
charge. no legal proceeding in
Missouri, only an affidavit presented to the Governor, and his demand upon the Governor of Illinois. Judge POPE, sitting in the
U. S. C. Ct. D. Ill., discharged.
Smith at once: 3 McLean 12r.
The writ will issue as soon as ap-
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plied for, although such a writ has
been asked from the State Court
and refused and an appeal with
supersedeas taken to the higher
Court of the State by the petitioner:
In /the matter ofJohn Leary (1879),
U. S. D. Ct. S. D. N. Y. io Ben.
197, 202.

Generally, the writ mustgo out as
soon as applied for, in a proper case,
or else the petitioner would be
likely to be removed from the
jurisdiction. For further instances
see In re Keller (xS88), U. S. D. Ct.
D. Minn., 36 Fed. Repr. 68r.
Besides the alleged criminal, the
agent of the State from which the
requisition conies may need prompt
relief; hence, the writ issued
(though the petitioner was finally remanded), as soon as he
was arrested for kidnapping a citizen named Blair under the color of
requisition papers from Illinois:
In re Biu/l (1877), U. S. C. Ct. D.
Neb., 4 Dill. 323. Equally prompt
was the release from arrest in an
action brought against the agentof
the State of Arkansas, for malicious
prosecution, by the party wanted
in Arkansas. The requisition was
upon the Governor of New York,
who issued his mandate to the Sheriff of Kings County, New York, to
arrest the alleged criminal. The
Sheriff made the arrest, but before
he could deliver the prisoner to the
agent, a Justice of the Supreme
Court of New York issued a habeas
com"pus and released the arrested
party. The petitioner, as a ministerial officer, was therefore entitled
to his discharge immediately : Tihts's Pe/ition (876), U. S. D. Ct.
S. D. N. Y., 8 Ben. 419.
Void Arress by State Authority.
In WVildenhus's Case (887), 120
U. S. I, on appeal from the refusal
to discharge, by the United States

Circuit Court for the District of
New Jersey (2 8 Fed. Repr. 924),
Chief Justice WAITE, speaking for
the Court, saw no reason why a
foreign consul might not immediately enforce his rights under a
treaty and procure the release from
arrest by the local authorities of a
seaman who had committed an assault upon the foreign vessel w.;thout disturbing the peace of the
port. As the assault had resulted
in death, the Court thought this
disturbed the peace of the port,
and therefore refused the discharge.
Similarly, Circuit Judge CAIDWELTL immediately released sellers
of liquor in "original packages,"
upon their arrest for violating the
State liquor laws: fu re Beine elal.
(i89o). U. S. C. Ct. D. Kan,, 42
Fed. Repr 545. This was between
the decision in Leisy v. Hardin
(1890), 135 U. S. 100 (29 AmERICAN
LAW REGISTER 497), and the approval of the Wilson bill (Id. 828).
Commercial travelers, or "drummers," also secure prompt attention, when arrested under State
statutes: In re Rudolph (x88o), U.
S. C. Ct. D. Nevada, 2 Fed. Repr.
65, though in this case the petitioner was erroneously remanded:
Robbins v. Tax.ingy Dis/ricl (1887),
o
120 U. S. 49 , and 29 AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER 747.
In the place
cited from the AmERICAN L kw
REGISTER, it will be observed that
counsel did not use this writ as
freely as they might have done for
prompt relief.
Immigrants also find prompt relief from detention under State
statutes void for attempting to
regulate foreign and interstate commerce: In re.4hFong(I874),U. S.
C. Ct. D. Cal., 3 Sawyer I44, which
was decided byJustice FIELD in the
Circuit Court in respect to one pas-
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senger by the steamer Japan by a
denial of the Constitutionality of a
statute of California, which Justice
MILLER styled in "a most extraordinary statute," while releasing
another passenger who had foolishly
sought justice through the courts
of the same State and only obtained
relief by appealing to the Supreme
Court of the United States: Chy
Lang v. Freeman (i8761, 2 Otto,
92 U. S. 275, 277. (See also 29
AmERICAN LAW REGISTER 459,
465.) On this appeal, the State authorities were wise enough not to
appear before the Supreme Court
of the United States; which affords
a most convincing proof of the fiportance of the Fourteenth Amnendmnent and the writ of habeas corfius
authorized by its provisions.
With equal promptness, the petitioner was released by Circuit
Judge SAWYER from arrest for violating the latest of the laundry
ordinances: The Stockton Laundry
Case, In re Tie Loy (1886), U. S.
C. Ct. D. Cal., 26 Fed. Repr. 611,
-which should not be confounded
vith the equally prompt action in
a similar case by Justice FIELD:
The Laundry Ordinance Case, In
the mat/er of Quong 1Woo (1882),
U. S. C. Ct. D. -Cal., i 3 Fed. Repr.
299. There was a similarly prompt
action by District Judge DEADY:
In re lan Yui (iS8 5 ), U. S. D. Ct.
D. Oregon, 22 Fed. Repr. 701.
More reasonable laundry regulations were promptly, though favor;ably, examined, and the prisonet
remanded, in Soon Hing v. Crowley (1884), 113"U. S. 703, wherein
Barbier v. Connoty. Id. 27, was
followed as to the constitutionality
of the local ordinance.
An earlier case arose fron the
arrest and binding over to answer
in a State court of the President of

the Sulphur Bank Quicksilver Mining Co. (a California corporation)
for violation of the Constitution of
that State (Art. XIX, 2), and
H 178 and 179 of the Penal Code,
forbidding the employment by any
corporation of any Chinese or Mongolian. Such a mandate being in
contravention of the Constitution
of the United States, the petitioner
was immediately released without
being put to his trial in the State
court: In i-e Tiburcio Parroll
( 8Sol, U. S. C. Ct. D. Cal., I Fed.
Repr. 481.
I Again, a petitioner was immediately relieved from arrest for refusing to testifv before the county
attorney: In re Ziebold (I885), U.
S. C. Ct. D. Kan., 23 Fed. Repr.
791, the State law authorizing such
arrest being declared void. The
same promptness of release occurred
where the petitioner had been only
arrested under a municipal ordinance against gamingand gambling
houses, this ordinance being beyond the municipal power to enact:
In re Lee Tong, (1883), U. S. D. Ct.
D. Oregon, 18 Fed. Repr. 253.
The necessity of such a speedy
remedy can be seen from U. S. v.
Spink (0884), U. S. C. Ct. R. D.
La., i9 Fed. Repr. 631, where the
United States Circuit Court had enjoined certain defendants from
prosecuting the petitioner for piloting vessels without a State license.
Defying the injunction, the defendants could have felt the strong
hand of the court, but could not
stop the action of the State laws.
Of course, the circuit and district
judges are not infallible (See Francis v. Flinn 1886, uS U. S. 385)
any more than State judges, but
the people and the States, by proper
exercise of Constitutional machinery, have preferred the judgment
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of the former, with a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United
States, to the slower method of
proceeding through the State courts
and ultimately to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Another striking instance, and one,
too, where the United States District Judge erroneously refused to
release the petitioners, was Ear
piarle Forbes el aL (1870), U. S. C.
Ct. D. Kan., I Dillon 363, where
Forbes and Pucket had been confined by the State Court for disobeying its injunction in a case over
which it had nojurisdiction. "Access to the Federal judiciary" was
refused because the United States
Statute (February 5, 1867, 14 Stat.
at Large 385, and now incorporated
in the Revised Statutes) only "gave
power to grant the writ [of habeas
corpus] 'in all cases where any
person imay be restrained of his or
her libert- in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States'
*
* since
they [the Federal judiciary] can administer no relief, unless the case
is provided for by federal legislation." Such is not the interpretatation of the law.
Cases where a bankrupt is arrested by State process, after or
even before his discharge, as In the
matter of Valk (1869), U. S. D. Ct.
S. D. N. Y. 3 Ben. 431, are not considered here, as falling within the
exercise of the distinctly different
Constitutional power, "to establish
* * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."
Void Convictions in State Courts.
In re Alh .ow (i886), U. S. C. Ct.
D. Cal. 29 Fed. Repr. 181, was an
instance of release immediately
upon conviction for "visiting a
room kept, in the City of Modesto,

by another, where opium was sold,"
that act being made an offense
without regard to lawfulness or
otherwise of such visit. The Court
expressly followed the principle of
Yick Wo v. Hobkins (i886), 118 U.
S. 356. Similarly, in E.r parte
YungJon (1886), U. S. D. Ct. D.
Oregon, 28 Fed. Repr. 3o8, the petitioner was hear, and remanded,
in case of a conviction for selling
opium under a State law supposed
to deprive the owner of opium of
his property without due process of
law, the law being held valid. And
another laundry case (in the City of
Napa) resulted also in the immediate release of the petitioner, whodid not seek the protection of the
United States court until after his
imprisonment had begun: In re
Sam Aee (1887), U. S. C. Ct. N. D.
Cal., 36 Fed. Repr. 68o.
There was equal promptness,
though with an opposite result,
where the title of the trial judge wa;
unsuccessfully impeached to secure
the release of a murderer: In re
Ak Lee (I88o), U. S. D. Ct. D. Oregon, 5Fed. Repr. 899. In re Wong
Yung Quy (1880), U. S. C. Ct. D.
Cal., 2 Fed. Repr. 624, was a similar case of a conviction for removing a dead body without a permit.
Er parte Kenyon (1878), U. S.
C. Ct. W. D. Ark., 5 Dillon 385,
was a case of immediate release
from conviction and sentence for
larceny, rendered in a court of the
Cherokee Nation, in Indian Territory. E xparte Dock Bridges was
the principal authority relied upon
for such prompt action, where the
facts disclosed no jurisdiction over
a husband charged with stealing'
the personal property of his deceased wife, no administration
having been raised on her estate.
The recent case of Expare U.

I-
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rich (i8go), U. S. D. Ct. W. D. Mo.
42 Fed. Repr. 587, is an illustration
of forbearance without any good
result, and therefore no proper
'obedience to the mandate, that the
court should "thereupon dispose
'of the party as law and justice reThe petitioner was arquire."
raigned in State criminal court of
Jhckson county, Missouri, upon
a charge of bigamy, and the trial
was begun, but first suspended to
allow another trial of another person, and finally stopped and continued to another day without the
consent of the prisoner. The petitioner then petitioned the United
-States District Judge for a habeas
eotpus, but "I deferred action, suggesting to the petitioner's counsel,
that nothing short of a sense of the
;supreme necessities of the prisoner's condition, could induce my
-interference. I preferred to wait
'and see whether or not the State
court would again attempt to put
;him to trial before another jury."
At his second trial, the petitioner
'pleaded that he was being put
twice in jeopardy, but the State
court went on to try, convict and
sentence. Again the United States
Jufdge "postponed the writ until
after the hearing of the motion for
a new trial " of a man who could
noi be tried at all on that charge.
.,The excuse for this delay is that
such:a motion for a new trial " is
recognized by the Supreme Court
of the State, as the due and golden
opportunity of the trial court, on
*calmer deliberation, to rectify its
errors committed in the progress
of the trial." So, very tardily, the
petitioner was released after being
* illegally confined without bail, from
April 26 to June 23, I89o, the United
States Judge remarking: "True it
is, the remedy yet remains to the

prisoner, to prosecute an appeal or
writ of error to the State Supreme
Court. The [State] Supreme Court
would not, however, grant the
prisoner the speedier relief by
habeas corpus, as in such cases it
only takes cognizance by writ of
error or, appeal. At this juncture
of the case, I recall the utterance of
Homer, that 'on the first day of
his servitude, the captive is deprived of one half of his manly virtue.' Each hour of the petitioner's
illegal restraint is not only a degradation in its tendency, but it is a
crime against liberty. The Supreme Court will in a few days adjourn until October next. Under
the most favorable circumstances,
no relief in that direction can possibly come to the petitioner for four
months. He may be unable to obtain bail. Must he lie in jail, and
go to the penitentiary, in violation
of his constitutional right to be set
free? Being invested with plenary
jurisdiction for his protection, to
fail to exert the power from an
over-scrupulous regard of the course
of procedure in the State courts,
would be as timorous, as it would
be indefensible."
There was no delay in E.r
parte Houghton (1881), U. S.
D. Ct. D. Vt., 7 Fed. Repr. 657,
when the petitioner had been
convicted in a State court of passing counterfeit national bank
bills. He was released, on application, not because the habeas
corpus was "a proceeding for relieving criminals at all from just
punishment," but "from punishment contrary to the laws of the
United States," to which lie was
still liable: WHEELER, D. J., Id.
665. The action of the District
Judge in Casar Griffin's Case
(1869), U. S. C. Ct., D. Va., Chase's
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Dec. 364, was reversed for quite
other reasons than the mere release
of one convicted in the State court,
the question there elaborately considered by Chief Justice CHASIbeing the effect of the disability of a
State judge under the third section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that "no person shall * *
hold any office, civil or military,
* * under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath as a member * * * of any State legislature, * . to support the Constitution of the United States, shall
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof."
Of course, ExbarteFonda(1886),
117 U. S. 516,'can be cited in defense of the tardy action just criticised. Chief Justice WAITrr declared the principles of Exr parle
Royall (supira, page 217,) did not
require the Supreme Court of the
United States to interfere for the
release of an embezzler from a
national bank, simply because he
had been tried in a State court and
had not yet appaled to the State
Supreme Court. He added that
"no reason is suggested why the
Supreme Court of the State may
not review the judgment of the
circuit court of the county upon
the question which is raised as to
the application of the statute,
under which the conviction has
been had, to embezzlements by
servants and clerks of national
banks; nor why it should not be
permitted to do so without interference by the courts of the United
States." As the question of jurisdiction is still unsettled (see U. S.
v. Luskey, 1889, U. S. C. Ct. E. D.
Va., 39 Fed. Repr. 99; Hoke v.

The People, 1887, 122 Ill. 511, and
State v. Cross et al., I888, 101 N.C.
770), this utterance of Chief Justice
VAITH may well be distinguished
as having been made in a case of
of the
uncertain
declaration
accused's Constitutional right to be
tried exciusively in the proper
United States court. It may be
well to add, that similar cases
arising in the United States courts
are governed by another principle;
that is, there must be a lack of
jurisdiction or subsequent power to
hold the petitibner under the
sentence: GRAY, J., Ex barle
Wilson (1885), 114 U. S- 417, 421
and citations; BLATCHFORD, J., .X
parle Snow (1887), 120 U. S. 274,
286.
The main purpose of the preceding annotation has been to indicate
a rapid process for relief in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of
the United States courts. Commercial travelers, and even mere
pleasure seekers, ;nay fall into the
meshes of State laws administered
without much regard to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, and with such clients, the
necessity for speedy action is as
great as its success is pleasing.
Again, it is important to observe
that the use of habeas corpus is not
liable to that abuse which might.
exist, if an appeal could not- be
taken to the Supreme Court of'the
United States, either by the State
or the petitioner. This equal rikht'
of appeal secures uniformity in
of Constitutional
the decision
claims, and prevents the local
United States judge from degenerating into a petty tyrant either
towards the local State authorities
or the petitioner.
JOHN B. UHLE.

